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This study aims at explaining the deviation between the budget balance ratio forecasts and the 
outcomes in the Portuguese official forecasts and in the European Commission (EC) vintage 
forecasts. Therefore, we used data from the EC for the period 1969-2011 and also the Portuguese 
official forecasts for 1977-2011. We explain the deviation of the budget balance-to-GDP through 
econometric estimations and present statistical decomposition about budget balance, revenue and 
spending-to-GDP deviations. The statistical significance of real GDP and inflation deviations 
reveals the effect of automatic stabilizers and the imperfect tax indexation system. The European 
panel reveals statistical significance (no significance) of investment (unemployment) deviation in 
the budget-to-GDP ratio. Countries with better fiscal rules seem to present favourable deviations 
(in the absence of fixed effects). In Portugal, there is evidence of unfavourable errors about the 
budget balance in nominal currency in most years, which has been offset (totally or partially) by a 
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This study aims at explaining the divergence between the State Budget deficit forecasts and 
the final outcomes in the Portuguese official forecasts and in the European Commission semi-
annual vintage forecasts. Nowadays this subject is quite interesting because fiscal policy has 
had an important role in the sovereign debt crisis as well as in the effects on the 
macroeconomic environment, and on its linkages with the financial and capital markets. 
Therefore, deviations between planned and observed fiscal balance-to-GDP ratios have 
affected the credibility of the implementation of fiscal policy in some countries in the euro 
area. As a consequence, such deviations may have caused negative impacts on the interests 
rates paid on public debt and made it difficult to rollover the outstanding stock of government 
debt.  
Furthermore, it is important to stress that during several years the budget deficit projections 
underlying the Portuguese State Budget as well as the Stability and Growth Programme, seem 
to present errors with reasonable size when compared with final national accounts’ outcome. 
For instance, the 3% limit for the budget deficit has been reached in some years under the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), but one-off measures on the revenue side were used in the 
beginning of the 2000s in order to respect such budget deficit ratio limit.  
Therefore, we carry out a study using two data sets from the European Commission – for the 
period 1969-2011 and 1998-2011, and also the Portuguese official forecasts for 1977-2011. 
We explain the dependent variable, the deviation of the budget balance ratio (and of the 
general government debt ratio in some cases) through econometric estimations, as well as a 
statistical decomposition about the deviations underlying the budget balance, revenue and 
spending-to-GDP ratios. 
The main conclusions of the thesis are: i) there is evidence that the deviations of real GDP 
and inflation can explain the deviations of the budget balance ratios, with statistical 
significance and a relevant magnitude, both in European and Portuguese data; ii) in the case 
of the European Commission forecasts, total investment growth deviations reveal statistical 
significance and low coefficient estimates, while the unemployment rate deviation is not 
relevant, and the fiscal rules index also presents statistical significance, when estimated 
without fixed effects; iii) in the case of Portuguese forecasts, the deviation of the budget 
balance-to-GDP ratio can be decomposed into a nominal effect with a unfavourable error, and 





The thesis is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related literature. Section three 
presents the methodology. Section four reports the results of the empirical analysis. Section 
five concludes. 
2 Related Literature 
To place this study in the literature, there are some studies about forecast balance errors’ 
performance and fiscal policy that should be taken into account. Some of the main studies as 
well as methodologies and results are presented here.   
Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) report that countries with better institutions faced less sovereign 
risk premium due to the fact that markets acknowledged that good institutions can reduce 
fiscal imbalances in the future. The authors also considered the fiscal governance literature. 
On the one hand, there is delegation in which the finance minister defines the agenda-setting 
and considers all tax implications of any spending, being a suitable model in governments 
with single party or coalition with parties of small ideological range. On the other hand, there 
can be a commitment process (fiscal contracts), which is more typical in countries with 
coalition of parties with a large difference on political ideology.   
The authors use the equation below, in which an investor expects the same return both in free 
interest rate (1 *)r  assets and in the risky bond that integrates a probability of default , 




In order to empirically test several hypotheses, they estimated the following equation that 
allowed understanding the effects of institutions as well controlling for the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) with a time-dummy effect: 
1 2 3 4
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it ititit it
itit itit
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(2) 
Furthermore, the regression below integrated 10-year yields and interest rates on spread 
denominated in currency of country i with respect to Germany, where spread variable means 
the yield differentials not related to exchange factors measured by the relative asset swap of a 
country.  

















The results reported by the authors indicated that well designed institutions had real effects on 
the bond spreads. Financial markets acknowledged the existence of well designed institutions 
when pricing default risk. Furthermore, after controlling for institutional improvements, fiscal 
policy remained an important explanatory factor of risk premium. 
Pina and Venes (2007) analyzed the track record of fiscal forecast errors of 15 European 
Union member states from 1994 to 2006. This paper used data from the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) instead of the SGP, as well as studying the forecast error not only of the 
budget balance-to-GDP ratio, but also the interest payments and gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF). The study included a large range of variables – economic variables of control, fiscal 
governance (commitment, delegation, mixed or fragmented), forthcoming elections, 
numerical rules, ongoing or run-up to EDP, and government’s strength or ideology. They used 
pooled OLS with clustered robust standard errors, while fixed effects were often imprecise 
and random effects estimator required more restrictive assumptions.  
They performed an analysis of bias and autocorrelation of forecast errors. In the analysis of 
budget balance forecast errors, countries with commitment or mixed forms in fiscal 
governance were associated with more prudent fiscal predictions. In addition, elections 
seemed to be linked to opportunistic motivations and fiscal rules were connected with more 
cautious forecasts. Regarding the forecast for GFCF, the announcement of significant public 
investments in countries with fragmented fiscal governance has presented low 
implementation, i.e. only part of what was materialized in the absence of sound fiscal 
processes. Wrapping up the authors conclude that interest payments and GFCF forecast errors 
as GDP ratios were harder to analyse. The effects of fiscal rules and institutions as well as 
opportunistic political variables have become stronger under the SGP. 
 
Moulin and Wierts (2006) investigated the track record of multiannual budgetary plans of 
European Union (EU) member states, using data from stability and convergence programmes. 
The results showed that there were failures in projected reductions of expenditure-to-GDP 
ratios rather due difficulties in reducing spending in nominal terms instead of stemming from 
unfavourable macroeconomic developments. The revenue-to-GDP ratio had not decreased as 
predicted, which limited the gap between the planned and observed variations in the 
government deficit ratio. 
They also analyzed the composition of the variation in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, and 





effect connected to divergences in nominal growth forecast. Furthermore, in the high initial 
deficit countries the denominator effect was more relevant than in other EU member states.  
 
Naturally, it is important to stress that over predictions of real GDP growth may have negative 
impacts on government spending. For instance, higher unemployment than expected puts 
pressure on social benefits, higher interest rates may imply larger debt interest payments, and 
the underestimation of inflation may increase nominal expenditure because social benefits and 
salaries of public employees are indexed on prices variation in many countries.  An analogous 
analysis can be performed for the revenue-to-GDP ratio. However, slippages seem to be 
smaller than in the expenditure ratios because the elasticity of government revenue with 
respect to output is estimated to be close to one, i.e. developments in economic growth would 
translate into proportionate variations in revenue, allowing a constant ratio.   
In addition, the authors also presented the decomposition of expenditure slippages for each 
individual country, 11 at total over the period 1998-2005, identifying the contribution of 
interest expenditure, inflation and real GDP growth. Overall, the divergence between 
budgetary predictions and outcomes may be explained by the inability of governments to cut 
expenditure in line with their ambitious plans. Furthermore, there was evidence of 
deliberately optimistic growth forecast for some countries when the European Commission 
projections were used as benchmark. 
Annett (2006) argued that the SGP had been a success in many EU countries, especially in 
smaller member states, which were subject to greater macroeconomic volatility and presented 
fiscal governance based on targets and contracts. The reputational costs for noncompliance 
would be more important in a small country due large external influences. In their analysis, 
with annual data from 1980-2004, they used several economic variables (lagged CAPB, 
output gap, and lagged deficit), fiscal governance (delegation, commitment or fiefdom), 
relative economic size, volatility growth and forthcoming elections.  
According to their results, countries with commitment and high growth volatility were 
associated with lower forecast errors in budgetary projections. The rules-based fiscal 
framework seemed to mitigate the adverse effects of elections, but in the SGP period this 
distortion rose again. It is important to stress that the member states with independent 





procyclical fiscal policy under the SPG period, which might be identified in the deterioration 
of the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) in good economic growth period. 
Brück and Stephan (2005) estimated the political determinants of budget deficit forecast 
errors in the period under the SGP, concluding that governments had manipulated predictions 
before elections. The political orientation and the institutional framework may have 
influenced the quality and bias of forecasts.  
The authors used Weighted Least Squares for testing the underlying rationality of predictions, 
with country and time-specific effects and factors such as GDP forecast errors, months till 
elections, political orientation, coalition government and minority government. The analysis, 
for eurozone and non-eurozone OECD countries, with data from Spring and Autumn 
publications of the European Commission, suggests that euro area governments issued biased 
budget predictions before elections with the introduction of SGP, in order to respect the limit 
imposed by the Pact. Furthermore, political parties of government moving to right (left) made 
cautious (optimistic) forecasts.  
Strauch, Hallerberg and von Hagen (2004) also studied the performance of budgetary and 
growth forecasts of EU member states. They assessed the impact of economic, political and 
institutional factors on the predictions, concluding that the cyclical position and fiscal 
governance were determinants of forecast biases. There were cautionary and optimist biases 
among countries. 
They used data from the Stability and Convergence Programmes from 1991 to 2002, and they 
report evidence of a pro-cyclical fiscal stance, at least during the convergence process until 
1998. Moreover, the authors studied the possibility of European Commission (EC) projections 
 encompassing the programme forecasts , suggesting that knowing the EC 
predictions little can be gained by further information coming from programme projections, 
as showed the estimation of the outcome  in the following model. 
1 2
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(3) 
In addition, the authors estimated the fiscal variable 
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f  in a multivariable regression, 
integrating political and institutional factors 
itP as well as economic control variables itX  in a 





institutional factors of fiscal governance (commitment, delegation or mixed), pre-election 
year and the ideological complexion of government (veto): 
1 2it it itit
f X P      
     
(4) 
Furthermore, they analyzed the fiscal stance f , i.e. change in the budgetary balance s , to see 
if the growth rate of GDP would have been the same as in preceding year.  
f s s 
.     
 (5) 
Artis and Marcellino (2000) studied the performance of the government deficit forecasts by 
international institutions – EC, IMF and OECD for the G7 countries, providing different 
outcome among countries and supporting an idea of asymmetric loss function. They assessed 
the likely unbiasedness in the forecast divergences in equation below, using a t-test for 
 (No bias) and a Lagrange Multiplier test (No corr): 
0h he v       
(6) 
where e denotes the forecasts errors, β is the constant term of equation and v the residuals. 
Moreover, they also studied whether the deviations in forecasts of the budget deficits can be 
explained by incorrect predictions of other macroeconomic variables, mostly GDP with 
impact on taxes revenue and expenditure through automatic stabilizers as well as whether 
inflation can influence balance through the imperfect tax indexation system. In practice, 
different results were found among countries, and there was no evidence of a single agency 
with the most accurate projections for all countries, but the EC seems to have a better 
performance for some countries.  However, it is important to stress that some results may be 
partially explained by the different timing forecasts among agencies because the information 
set may be different. 





Table I. Related literature 





The impact of fiscal institutions and 
strength of the finance minister, in the 
budget process, on interest rate spreads. 
Investor integrates a probability of default 
in the risky bonds. 
Well designed institutions had real 
effects on the bond spreads. Financial 
markets acknowledged them when 
pricing default risk. 






Two innovations: Data from EDP and 
forecasts of interests and GFCF. 
Large range of variables, including fiscal 
governance (commitment, delegation, 
mixed or fragmented).  
Estimation error in interest payments 
was difficult to interpret. 
Opportunistic political variables had 
become stronger under SGP. 
Moulin and 
Wierts (2006) 
EU – SCP 
 
Decomposition of variation in the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio – nominal effect 
was more relevant than denominator one. 
Inability of governments to cut 
expenditure. Evidence of deliberately 
optimistic growth forecast. 
Annett (2006) EU 
Success of SGP in many smaller countries 
subject to greater macroeconomic 
volatility, fiscal governance (targets and 
contracts) and reputational costs and 
external influences.  
Independent forecasts presented 
lower prediction deviation. Pro-
cyclical fiscal policy under SPG. 









The political orientation and the 
institutional framework may have 
influenced the quality and bias of 
forecasts. 
Euro area governments issued biased 
budget predictions before elections, 
under SGP. Government moving to 










Analysis of economic, political and 
institutions factors in a multivariable 
regression, including fiscal governance 
(commitment, delegation, mixed or 
fragmented). Elasticity of balance with 
respect to GDP prediction error. 
Cyclical position and fiscal 
governance were determinants of 
forecast biases. There were 
cautionary and optimist biases among 
countries. Pro-cyclical fiscal stance 








Forecast errors of deficit might be 
explained by GDP and inflation. Probably 
persistent errors from tracking behaviour. 
No agency with best performance. 
Different timing forecasts among 
agencies. Asymmetric quadratic loss 
function would be possible. 
 
3 Methodology 
The current study of budgetary forecasts will take into account the semi-annual forecast 





years and a range of economic predictable variables as large as possible. In this context 
deviation is defined by the realisation, r, minus the forecast, f:  
,, ,i ti t i t
fe r 
,     
(7) 
where i denotes country and t is the period of prediction. 
3.1 Forecasts from the European Commission 
We will assess whether the deviation of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio can be explained by 
deviations of other economic variables. We will use two different approaches – unbalanced 
panels that will study a set of countries as well as seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in 
order to analyse each country in a particular way. 
In addition, the study will also assess the deviations about the decomposition of the 
government budget constraint - snow ball effect of public debt stock, interest effect, nominal 
GDP effect, primary balance and other adjustments. This specification integrates not only 
adjustments with direct impact on government debt but also variables connected to the budget 
deficit. Therefore, the growth forecast accuracy would have an important role on taxes, 
expenditures and on the denominator of the ratio. The government budget constraint in (8) 
illustrates such dynamics: 
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(8) 
where b is the debt-to-GDP ratio, i is the implicit interest rate paid on the outstanding stock of 
government debt, n is the nominal growth rate of the economy, g is the primary spending-to-
GDP ratio,  is the revenue-to-GDP ratio, and sf is the stock-flow adjustment-to-GDP ratio.1  
Furthermore, the decomposition presented by Moulin and Wierts (2006) identifies the 
nominal and the denominator effects, which allows knowing whether the budget balance 
forecast error is coming from divergence predictions on GDP as well as from expenditure or 
revenue items. The decomposition of these effects can be done via 
t n t t n t t t n t
t n t t n t n t
G G G G G Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y
       
          
      
         .     
(9) 
                                                          
1
 The stock-flow adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual accounting, accumulation of financial 
assets, valuation changes as well as other residual effects. This term has assumed particular relevance during the 
recent crisis in light of the financial support provided by many euro area governments to ailing financial 





Strauch, Hallerberg and von Hagen (2004) studied the elasticity of the budget balance with 
respect to the GDP prediction error , concluding that when actual output growth 
exceeds forecasts, the budget balance improves by 0.59 percentage points when compared 
with the budgetary prediction  
0.07 0.59balance growthe e v   .     
(10) 
In this study we will take into account deviations not only of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio 
and of real GDP but also of the unemployment rate, investment and other variables. 
3.2 Forecasts from the Portuguese Government  
The Portuguese data will be studied with a particular detail, i.e. the deviation between 
forecasts of budget balance-to-GDP ratios and the respective realisations will be explained by 
divergence of predictions of real GDP growth and price variations. Furthermore, it will be 
possible to have the decomposition of the deviation of budget balance-to-GDP ratios between 
denominator and nominal effect, as well as identifying the size of temporary measures in 
recent years.  
 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data 
The data base covers the vintage forecasts of the European Commission regarding the two 
publications per year – Spring and Autumn, while the Portuguese Government predictions 
come from the state budget reports and/or from other connected documents in a 
supplementary way detailed below.
2
 Predictions about real GDP, prices variation and balance 
are the main variables taken into account by these two last institutions. Therefore, some 
variables may be hidden, which would be an additional source of problems in the econometric 
analysis. Furthermore, Stability (or Convergence) Growth Programmes could have been an 
alternative data source because they include a set of variables required by the European 
institutions in order to present comparable information. However, this kind of analysis has 
been already used by other studies.  
                                                          
2
 The forecasts of the OECD and the IMF were not included because there was no available large range of 
variables in a reasonable period in order to build comparable series for a small country like Portugal. For a 





4.1.1 European Commission  
There are two data bases about forecasts with different range of variables and periods. A data 
set
3
 for the period (1969-2011) includes the European Union, the Euro Area and the 15 oldest 
Member States
4
 since the year of adhesion to the EU. This dataset contains current year 
projections from the Spring publication, one year ahead projections from the Autumn 
forecast, as well as realisations based on the “first available estimates” published in the 
following year – the Spring estimates and values available in the Autumn, for the current year 
and year ahead, respectively. Some economic variables with available deviations are budget 
balance-to-GDP ratio, inflation, investment, unemployment rate, current account as 
percentage of GDP and employment variation.  
 
Another data set was built for the EMU period (1999-2011) with twice a year vintage 
forecasts since Spring 1998 (original time span is 1998:1-2010:2) for the same set of 
countries, including a larger range of variables – real GDP, inflation, GDP deflator, 
unemployment rate, investment, general government gross debt, primary balance, revenue-to-
GDP, expenditure-to-GDP, and budget balance-to-GDP ratios. Some variables were not 
available in the beginning of this period for all countries and Luxembourg had not available 
data in some indicators until later - Autumn 1999. This data base will allow econometric 
estimations as well as the decomposition of effects underlying the government budget 
constraint and revenue/expenditure-to-GDP ratios. It is important to stress that this data set 




 There are differences 
between data sets because the realizations for the period 1969-2011 are based on first 
estimates, while the outcomes for 1998-2011 contains revised data (and revisions usually 
contain systematic bias in Europe, see Castro, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the fiscal rules index published by the European Commission for the period 
1990-2010 also will be taken into account, as a possible determinant of forecast deviations. 
This time span is longer when compared with existing studies about this subject, but it is not 
                                                          
3
 This data base was kindly provided by the DGECFIN and had been used in a previous study for the period 
1969-2005 (Melander, Sismanidis, & Grenouillea, 2007). Data base was updated until 2011 in line with authors 
criteria, notably realization based on the “first available estimates” instead of final results, which would have 
revised values in some cases. 
4
 Countries included are: Belgium; Germany; Greece; Spain; France; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; 
Austria; Portugal; Finland; Denmark; Sweden; United Kingdom. 
5





as long as the data base (1969-2011) available for other variables, which then constrains a 
panel econometric estimation.   
 
4.1.2 Portuguese Government 1977-2011 
The set of available variables includes deviations of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio, real 
GDP growth rates and prices variation. The information comes from the state budget reports 
for recent years as well as from the State Budget Law, Decree-Law and Grandes Opções do 
Plano for the earlier period. The predictions underlying to the State Budget are available 
during the end of previous year
6
. However, the State Budget Laws were available during the 
implementation year in case of elections, appointments of new a government or other political 
factors. The data set was then constructed covering each predictable variable with particular 
detail – source, universe, and publication date.
7
  
The availability of information during 1970s and 1980s is scarce and the month of publication 
was different among years.  For example, the prediction for 1979 was found in Previsões 
Macroeconómicas of October 1979 - real GDP and prices. In addition, projections for 1983 
were another difficult case, and we used Grandes Opções do Plano for the medium term 
published in 1981, for forecasts about real GDP and prices variation because predictions of 
economic variables were not available in 1983.  
The prediction of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio of the Administrative Public Sector on 
accrual basis was the desirable variable connected with the budgetary forecasts during the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s, however, in some years there was only information on cash basis. 
The general government balance on accrual basis is the measure of public sector in recent 
years, which has been used by Eurostat.  
The desirable measure of price variation is the GDP deflator. Still, it was not possible to find 
information about this variable for 1989 and 1990. Therefore, it was used a measure of 
inflation in a supplementary way – the variation of private consumption deflator and 
consumer prices index for 1989 and 1990 respectively. 
 
The final data for the Portuguese case come from the National Accounts provided by the 
Statistics Portugal (INE) according to the European System Account as well as from the 
                                                          
6
 Actually, the government must present a draft of the State Budget and a deliver it to the Parliament until 15 
October, unless elections take place and a new government takes in this period. 
7





Eurostat and AMECO data base. This information, reported by INE to European Institutions, 
is comparable with data from other member states.  
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 European Commission 
4.2.1.1 Analysis for 1969-2011 
The estimations based on one year ahead forecasts (data from Autumn) suggests that the 
deviations of budget balance-to-GDP ratios may be explained by errors of projections about 
other variables – mostly real GDP growth, investment variation and inflation (see Table II).  
In regression (1), we may conclude that a favourable deviation of real GDP of 1 percentage 
point (pp) has a positive impact of 0.39 pp on the deviations of general government budget 
balance ratio. Higher inflation than predicted of 1pp may improve the balance-to-GDP ratio in 
0.23pp. These effects may be associated with deviation of nominal GDP, in which higher 
growth means lower unemployment, less social benefits and higher tax receipts in line with 
expected with automatic stabilizers. Investment variations seem to present statistical 
significance, but the coefficient has a low magnitude.  
The dependent variable and explanatory variables included in regressions are the following: 
 
** *
( ) ( ) ( )
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where  *( )
1 1t tb b   denotes dependent variable (first difference of the budget balance ratio 
deviation). Explanatory variables are the same operator about real growth (gdp), investment 













Table II. Estimation for the first difference of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio 
deviation, 1969-2011, *( )
1 1t tb b     
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.0054 0.0115 0.0124 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Δ real GDP growth deviation   0.3883*** 0.3813*** 0.3775*** 
 (4.5) (4.5) (4.3) 
Δ investment growth deviation 0.0968*** 0.0940*** 0.1097*** 
 (3.1) (2.8) (3.2) 
Δ inflation deviation 0.2283* 0.2217* 0.2306* 
 (1.9) (1.8) (1.9) 
Δ unemployment rate deviation  -0.0805 -0.0615 
  (-0.8) (-0.6) 
Δ current account deviation   0.0628* 
   (1.7) 
AR(1) -0.3301*** -0.3353*** -0.3471*** 
  (-4.7) (-4.6) (-4.9) 
Adjusted R-square 0.35 0.35 0.36 
Observations 509 503 494 
Period  1972-2011 1973-2011 1973-2011 
 Notes: fixed effects. t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
We analyzed endogeneity between dependent variable and real GDP growth deviation 
through instrument variables (IV) and two stage least squares (2SLS). The instruments were 
the lagged real GDP growth deviation (first and second lags). It was not found evidence of 
endogeneity. See Table III and Table A2. 
 
The regressions take into account the estimate of real GDP growth deviation in order to 
evaluate its statistical significance 
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Table III. Estimation for the first difference of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio 
deviation, 1969-2011, *( )
1 1t tb b     (instrumental variables) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
constant 0.1342 0.1361 0.1296 
 (0.9) (1.0) (0.9) 
Δ real GDP growth deviation   0.3946*** 0.3716*** 0.3644*** 
 (4.0) (3.9) (3.8) 
Δ investment growth deviation 0.0983*** 0.0977*** 0.1123*** 
 (2.9) (2.8) (3.1) 
Δ inflation deviation 0.2164* 0.2032* 0.2084* 
 (1.9) (1.8) (1.8) 
Δ unemployment rate deviation  -0.0950 -0.0835 
  (-1.2) (-1.0) 
Δ current account deviation   0.0567* 
   (1.7) 
Estimate of Δ real GDP growth deviation   0.3143 0.4296 0.4025 
 (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) 
AR(1) 0.2746*** 0.2671*** 0.2690*** 
  (3.7) (3.5) (3.7) 
Adjusted R-square 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Observations 497 496 488 
Period  1973-2011 1973-2011 1973-2011 
 Notes: t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels 
 
In this case, it does not seem that there is evidence of endogeneity because the estimated 
parameter for real GDP growth deviation does not present statistical significance. 
 
Regression (2) shows that forecast deviations about the unemployment rate do not contribute 
to explain the dependent variable. On the other hand, in regression (3) we see that positive 
forecast errors in current account-to-GDP ratios have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the budget balance deviation errors. Forecast errors of inflation, the unemployment 
rate and real GDP growth remain rather similar in magnitude in regressions (2) and (3).    
The average of real GDP deviations in the sample as a whole reveals a negative deviation, 
while inflation presents a positive one, which means the EC forecasts may have overestimated 
real growth and underestimated inflation, attaining eventually a similar nominal GDP with a 
different decomposition. 
 
We used a first differences method in order to avoid eventual problems connected with 





been taken into account as dummy variables such as in some studies. However, our panel data 
set (vintage forecasts) starts in the beginning of the 1970s, in which case there was a lack of 
information about fiscal rules. Therefore, one possible solution to overcome that likely 
problem may be a regression based on the first differences method. 
 
Furthermore, given that the Durbin Watson statistics seems to reveal serial correlation when it 
was used deviation of predictions. Therefore, it was taken into account a AR(1) variable in 
order to address that issue. However, we have estimated the budget balance ratio deviation 
with fixed effects:    
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Table IV. Estimation for the budget balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1969-2011, 
*
( )
1 1t tb b    
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
constant 0.0624 0.0434 0.0395 
 (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) 
real GDP growth deviation   0.3954*** 0.3699*** 0.3658*** 
 (4.0) (3.9) (3.8) 
investment growth deviation 0.1025*** 0.1025*** 0.1149*** 
 (3.1) (3.0) (3.4) 
inflation deviation 0.1949* 0.1882 0.1878 
 (1.7) (1.6) (1.6) 
unemployment rate deviation  -0.0977 -0.0859 
  (-1.2) (-1.1) 
current account deviation   0.0343 
   (1.0) 
AR(1) 0.2454*** 0.2385*** 0.2392*** 
  (3.3) (3.2) (3.3) 
Adjusted R-square 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Observations 526 520 512 
Period  1971-2011 1972-2011 1972-2011 
 Notes: fixed effects. t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels 
 
In this case we analyzed the likely endonegeity between budget balance deviation and real 
GDP growth rate error. In this case the instruments were real GDP growth rate of previous 






Table V. Estimation for the budget balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1969-2011,  
*
( )
1 1t tb b   (instrumental variables) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
constant 0.1342 0.1361 0.1296 
 (0.9) (1.0) (0.9) 
real GDP growth deviation   0.3946*** 0.3716*** 0.3644*** 
 (4.0) (3.9) (3.8) 
investment growth deviation 0.0983*** 0.0977*** 0.1123*** 
 (2.9) (2.8) (3.1) 
inflation deviation 0.2164* 0.2032* 0.2084* 
 (1.9) (1.8) (1.8) 
unemployment rate deviation  -0.0950 -0.0835 
  (-1.2) (-1.0) 
current account deviation   0.0567* 
   (1.7) 
Estimate of real GDP growth deviation   0.3143 0.4296 0.4025 
 (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) 
AR(1) 0.2746*** 0.2671*** 0.2690*** 
  (3.7) (3.5) (3.7) 
Adjusted R-square 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Observations 497 496 488 
Period  1973-2011 1973-2011 1973-2011 
 Notes: fixed effects t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels 
 
We also analyzed the estimations about the predictions of current year (prediction of t in 
year t), but results seemed statistically poor, which may be a signal that there is no systematic 
error in the estimated specifications in the short term. The real GDP growth deviation remains 
















Table VI. Estimation for the budget balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1969-2011,   
*
( )
t tb b   
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
constant -0.1439 -0.1405 -0.1416 
 (1.2) (-1.1) (-1.1) 
real GDP growth deviation   0.2892*** 0.3085*** 0.3488*** 
 (3.1) (2.8) (3.0) 
investment growth deviation 0.0265 0.0231 -0.0028 
 (0.7) (0.5) (-0.1) 
inflation deviation 0.1253 0.1350 0.1249 
 (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) 
unemployment rate deviation  0.0519 0.0462 
  (0.3) (0.3) 
current account deviation   -0.1111 
   (-1.4) 
AR(1) 0.2474 0.2461 0.2717 
  (1.3) (1.3) (1.5) 
Adjusted R-square 0.19 0.19 0.26 
Observations 680 680 680 
Period  1972-2011 1972-2011 1972-2011 
 Notes: fixed effects. t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels 
 
Another possibility is the inclusion of a fiscal rules index in order to proxy the quality of 
fiscal governance. Our unbalanced panel covers now a shorter period, 1990-2010, because the 
fiscal rules index, which is connected with fiscal governance and may be a measure of 
budgetary process, has a smaller time span availability. This fiscal rule index is derived from 
a questionnaire
8
 that has been sent to all EU member states, which integrates a large range of 
questions. The survey includes information about nature of the fiscal rule, covered subsectors, 
legal base of the rule, monitoring of compliance, enforcement of compliance, media and 
public reaction in case of non-compliance and long-term impact.   
 
Table VII presents estimation results with the fiscal rule index, and we see that the precious 
results are kept. Moreover, in regression (1) a favourable deviation of 1 pp in real GDP means 
a positive deviation of 0.40 pp in the error of the general government budget balance ratio. In 
addition, deviation errors in inflation of 1 pp result in an impact of 0.46 pp on the dependent 
variable, while an error of investment variation imply a 0.11 pp effect.  
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The fiscal rule index is statistically significant, as expected due to previous studies. In fact, we 
can conclude that the predictions of the EC about a country with a better fiscal rule index 
tends to increase more likely a favourable (positive) deviation (or reduce an unfavourable 
one) in the error forecast of the budget balance ratio.   
 
Table VII.  Estimation of budget balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1990-2010,  *( )
1 1t tb b   
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
constant 0.1264 0.1222 0.1273 
 (0.7) (0.6) (0.7) 
 real GDP growth deviation   0.4001** 0.3924*** 0.3961*** 
 (2.5) (2.8) (2.7) 
 investment growth deviation 0.1138** 0.1126** 0.1314** 
 (2.2) (2.1) (2.2) 
 inflation deviation 0.4640* 0.4633* 0.4362* 
 (1.8) (1.8) (1.8) 
 unemployment rate deviation  -0.0415 -0.0085 
  (-0.3) (-0.1) 
 current account deviation   -0.0036 
   (-0.0) 
fiscal rules index 0.3294*** 0.3273*** 0.3270** 
 (2.6) (2.6) (2.5) 
AR(1) 0.3204*** 0.3173*** 0.3143*** 
  (2.9) (2.9) (2.8) 
Adjusted R-square 0.43 0.44 0.44 
Observations 285 285 277 
Period  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
          Notes: t-statistics in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels 
 
On the other hand, we have estimated the equations with panel least squares and fixed effects, 
however, the statistical significance of the fiscal rules index disappears (when compared with 
regressions without fixed effects), which may indicate that the individual effects of each 












Table VIII.  Estimation of budget balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1990-2010,   
*
( )
1 1t tb b    
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
Constant 0.2209* 0.2123 0.2040 
 (1.7) (1.6) (1.6) 
 real GDP growth deviation   0.4229*** 0.4115*** 0.4260*** 
 (2.8) (2.9) (2.9) 
 investment growth deviation 0.1235** 0.1212** 0.1386** 
 (2.4) (2.3) (2.4) 
 inflation deviation 0.4696* 0.4673* 0.4567* 
 (1.9) (1.9) (2.0) 
 unemployment rate deviation  -0.0660 -0.0218 
  (-0.7) (-0.2) 
 current account deviation   -0.0032 
   (-0.0) 
fiscal rules index 0.1061 0.1051 0.1487 
 (0.8) (0.8) (1.2) 
AR(1) 0.1876* 0.1827 0.1748 
  (1.7) (1.6) (1.5) 
Adjusted R-square 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Observations 285 285 277 
Period  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
          Notes: fixed effects. t-statistics in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
The regressions in Table VIII does not include data before 1990 of countries that entered in 
the EU before that year due to the unavailability of fiscal rules index as mentioned before. 
Furthermore, there is no available information about 2011. 
 
Returning to the longer data set (1969-2011), we can estimate a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR), i.e. estimating regressions with the same variables for each individual 
country. However, the size of sample is different among countries because the availability of 
variables for each country is connected with the year they entered the in EU. Therefore, the 
oldest Member States – France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg – 
have 41 annual observations, while Finland, Sweden and Austria have 17 observations.  
 
In Table IX, the SUR estimation results of t+1, in year t, reveal that variables have different 






For example, in the case of the EU with 41 observations there are three variables with 
statistical significance – inflation (0.10 pp), investment (0.13 pp) and real GDP (0.37 pp). In 
case of France, the same set of variables present statistical importance, but with different scale 
of parameters, 0.34 pp, 0.23 pp and 0.29 pp, respectively. The general specification for 
country i is presented below: 
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 real GDP 
growth 
deviation   
observations 
Belgium -0.35 0.06 0.07 -0.27 0.19 41 
Germany 0.36** -0.1 0.08* -0.06 0.39*** 41 
Greece -1.28** 0.29 0.2* 0.09 -0.02 30 
Spain -0.61** 0.22 0.07 -0.24 0.96*** 25 
France 0.05 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.22 0.29** 41 
Ireland -0.52 -0.03 0.14** 0.26 0.67*** 38 
Italy -0.43* 0.19** 0.01 -0.17 0.31 41 
Luxembourg 1.48*** 0.06 0 -0.39 0.09 36 
Netherlands 0.07 0.2 0.1** -0.17 0.45*** 41 
Austria 0.5*** 0.56*** 0.05 0.34** 0.16 17 
Portugal -0.21 0.69*** 0.05 0.27 0.48 25 
Finland 1.06*** 0.49*** 0.14*** 0.61** 0.47*** 17 
Denmark 0.22 0.21 0.21*** 0.37* 0.13 35 
Sweden 1.22*** -0.22 0.12*** 0.11 0.1 17 
United Kingdom -0.18 0.13 0.14** 0.03 0.57*** 38 
European Union 0.07 0.1** 0.13*** -0.04 0.37*** 41 
Euro Area 0.33*** 0.32** 0.23** -0.4 0.32 13 
Note: Total system (unbalanced), 537 observations. Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. t-statistics 
in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
4.2.1.2 Analysis for 1999-2011 
In a panel approach for the period 1998:1-2010:2 the deviation of forecasts of general 
government budget balance ratio in the year t+1 may be explained by other economic 
variables projected to t+1, notably divergences in inflation and in real GDP, see estimation 
results in Table X. Furthermore, deviations of observed budget balances in the previous year t 





the unemployment rate as well as the period when forecasts were published (Spring or 
Autumn) does not present statistical significance. There is no evidence of endogeneity (See 
appendix Table A3). 
 
Regression (1) of Table X suggests that there is a favourable deviation of 0.67 pp of budget 
balance-to-GDP ratios in case of no deviations about other variables. Errors in inflation 
forecasts (1 pp) imply an upward deviation of 0.71 pp and real GDP positive growth 
deviations of 1 pp cause an upward realization of 0.41 pp in the budget balance ratios’ error 
deviations. The estimation results in regression (1) are then rather consistent with the 
automatic stabilizers mechanisms and an imperfect indexation tax system. Deviations in total 
investment growth regressions (2) and (3) have a statistical significance, which may imply 
that higher than expected investment realizations may also be connected with higher real 
GDP. 
 
Table X. Estimation of balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1998:1-2010:2, *( )
1 1t tb b    
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
constant -0.6652** -0.5950** -0.5588** -0.4029 
 (-2.1) (-2.1) (-2.4) (-1.2) 
 real GDP growth deviation   0.4105*** 0.1336 0.1641 0.4283*** 
 (4.3) (0.9) (0.9) (3.3) 
investment growth deviation  0.1747** 0.1632**  
  (2.3) (2.4)  
inflation deviation 0.7095*** 0.7071*** 0.7045*** 0.7430*** 
 (2.7) (2.7) (3.0) (3.1) 
unemployment rate deviation -0.1539 -0.0434   
 (-0.6) (-0.2)   
balance-to-GDP in t0 -0.0202 -0.1131   
 (-0.1) (-0.7)   
fiscal rules index    -0.5027 
    (-1.1) 
AR(1) 0.5982*** 0.5968*** 0.5575*** 0.6016*** 
  (8.0) (9.1) (5.1) (5.8) 
Adjusted R-square 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.68 
Observations 425 392 392 375 
Period 1998:2-2010:2 1999:1-2010:2 1999:1-2010:2 1998:2-2010:2 
Notes: fixed effects. t-statistics in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
On the other hand, in regression (4) in Table X, we get a low estimated coefficient for the 





Commission forecasts are more able to take into account the different performance of fiscal 
governance among countries in the EMU period. Some previous studies (von Hagen, 2010) 
have reported the importance of that kind of determinants. Therefore, fiscal governance 
indicators would have statistical importance in the case of data provided by the national 
governments such as Stability (or Convergence) and Growth Programmes. The fiscal rules for 
the budget balance ratio based on the output gap would have been wrong, because potential 
output bias has been relevant. Therefore, the admissible deficit in real time would have 
exceeded final values (Kempkes, 2012).  
Interestingly, Martins (2012) concludes that the European Commission forecasts were biased, 
which may be problematical when used as benchmark to evaluate the quality of government 
forecasts. However, in some cases such as Portugal and Italy, with optimistic government 
predictions of growth and public accounts, the European Commission forecasts may be a 
useful reference. 
 
In addition, we also assessed the determinants of the forecasts deviations of gross debt of the 
general government. However, the results show that some variables (budget balance ratio 
deviation and real GDP growth error) present strong statistical significance.  
The dependent variable *( )
1 1t tdebt debt   is the deviation of the prediction for general 
government debt: 
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Table XI. Estimation of debt-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1998:1-2010:2,  
*
( )
1 1t tdebt debt    
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 1.2943* 1.1611 1.1133 0.7012 
 (1.7) (1.4) (1.4) (0.8) 
balance-to-GDP in t+1 -0.5933*** -0.5849*** -0.6400*** -0.6178*** 
 (-5.6) (-4.5) (-6.4) (-5.9) 
 real GDP growth deviation   -0.8654*** -0.8380*** -0.8729*** -0.8531*** 
 (-4.5) (-3.2) (-5.1) (-4.9) 
investment growth deviation  -0.0113   
  (-0.1)   
inflation deviation -0.2409 -0.3420   
 (-0.7) (-0.8)   
unemployment rate deviation 0.5722* 0.5880* 0.6070* 0.6181* 
 (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) 
balance-to-GDP in t0 -0.9954*** -0.9749*** -1.0050*** -1.0067*** 
 (-15.7) (-13.1) (-15.8) (-15.4) 
fiscal rules index    0.7610* 
    (1.7) 
AR(1) 0.7699*** 0.7819*** 0.7690*** 0.7654*** 
  (14.3) (14.9) (13.8) (13.6) 
Adjusted R-square 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 
Observations 425 292 425 375 
Period 1998:2-2010:2 1999:1-2010:2 1998:2-2010:2 1998:-2010:2 
Notes: fixed effects. t-statistics in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
Turning now to the seemingly unrelated regression approach it would be desirable conclude 
that deviations in variables of some countries could explain divergence of balance relative to 
GDP. The serial correlation is an additional problem when estimating the regressions. The 
specification is the following one: 
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Table XII. Estimation of balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1999:1-2010:2 *( )
1, 1,t i t ib b 
 
Variable constant 
 real GDP 
growth 










Belgium -0.3 0.75*** 0.48*** -0.34** -0.06 0.42*** 23 
Germany 0.53** -0.21 0.44** -0.3*** 0.3*** 0.45*** 23 
Greece -4.65*** 0.4* 1.47*** 0.94*** 0.07 0.59*** 23 
Spain -0.42** 1.28*** -0.06 0.09 0.26*** 0.09 23 
France -0.16 0.6*** 0.57*** -0.07 -0.01 0.44*** 23 
Ireland -0.79 0 1.1*** 1.51*** 0.56*** 0.15 23 
Italy -0.48 0.37* 0.24 -0.77*** -0.06 0.62*** 23 
Luxembourg 1.01 -0.07 0.53*** -0.56** 0.17*** 0.62*** 23 
Netherlands -0.02 0.53*** -0.04 -0.63** 0.31*** 0.67*** 23 
Austria -0.45 -0.05 0.75** -0.53* 0.12 0.43*** 23 
Portugal -1.58** 0.4 1.42*** -0.08 -0.12 0.59*** 23 
Finland 0.06 0.39*** 0.37** -1.15*** -0.05 0.72*** 23 
Denmark 1.61** 0.51*** 0.62*** -0.61** -0.01 0.72*** 23 
Sweden 0.33 -0.15 -0.25 -0.46*** 0.25*** 0.66*** 23 
United Kingdom -1.33** 0.76*** 1.45*** 0 0.14** 0.74*** 23 
European Union -0.29 0.75*** 0.55*** -0.37** -0.1 0.49*** 24 
Euro Area -0.05 0.19 0.45*** -0.2 0.19*** 0.44*** 23 
Note: Total system (unbalanced), 392 observations. Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. t-statistics 
in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
We used a AR(1) parameter in order to overtake serial correlation, however, this problem 
remain about half of the cases.  For example, in Spain there are three variables with statistical 
significance – constant (-0.42 pp), real GDP growth deviation (1.28 pp) and total investment 
(0.26 pp), while in Ireland there are three other variables – inflation error (1.1 pp), 
unemployment rate (1.51 pp) and total investment (0.56 pp).   
4.2.1.3 Government Budget constraint 1999-2011 
Taking into account a set of variables provided by the European Commission forecasts during 
the EMU period, it is possible to decompose the variation of the general government gross 
debt. However, it is important to stress that the data sources of the forecasts of each variable 
has one decimal place, which may differ a little from the real projection after some 
calculations. For example, the forecast of the snow ball effect considers interest expenditure, 
real GDP and GDP deflator (inflation when it is not available) while the stock flow 
adjustment is obtained by difference. Furthermore, there may be some small differences 





effect, primary balance effect, and stock flow adjustments because some predictable variables 
were not available in some years for all countries.
9
 Again, the period under analysis covers 
semi-annual vintage forecasts from Autumn 1999 to Autumn 2010. 
 
Table XIII presents the medium deviation (ME = realization - forecast) for the 15 Member 
States, the European Union and the Euro zone.
 10
  Predictions were published in year t for year 
t+1, including both Spring and Autumn forecasts. The European Commission has predicted 
on average positive (negative) variations of gross debt of general government with respect to 
GDP in some (other) countries, however, realizations have been higher (less negative or 
positive) than forecasted, i.e. we may conclude that there may have been a bias – optimistic 
predictions. Figure 1 also illustrates those results. 
 
 



















Belgium 1.10 -0.23 0.27 0.04 0.50 0.55 
Germany 1.46 -0.06 0.37 0.31 0.11 1.04 
Greece 6.19 0.29 1.67 1.96 4.48 -0.25 
Spain 0.56 -0.12 -0.05 -0.17 1.29 -0.56 
France 1.33 -0.12 0.26 0.14 0.76 0.43 
Ireland 4.48 0.06 0.99 1.04 2.79 0.65 
Italy 1.72 0.02 1.12 1.14 0.66 -0.09 
Luxembourg 0.90 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -1.52 2.43 
Netherlands 1.17 -0.21 0.28 0.07 0.67 0.43 
Austria 0.66 -0.11 -0.05 -0.16 0.51 0.31 
Portugal 3.41 -0.03 0.73 0.71 1.74 0.97 
Finland 0.96 -0.22 0.21 -0.01 -0.11 1.08 
Denmark 1.26 -0.28 0.17 -0.11 0.10 1.27 
Sweden 0.60 -0.55 0.24 -0.30 0.60 0.30 
United Kingdom 2.21 0.09 0.22 0.31 1.04 0.86 
European Union 1.40 -0.07 0.58 0.51 0.76 0.13 
Euro Area 1.40 -0.05 0.44 0.39 0.72 0.30 
  
Results show that the European Commission has underestimated the positive variation of 
general government gross debt as percentage of GDP with a particular size in Greece, Ireland 
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 Data for Luxembourg had not all variables in Autumn 1999.  
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and Portugal, especially in the primary balance. The deviation in the snow ball effect is 
negative or positive among countries, but close to zero (sees Table XIII).  
 
Figure 1. Government Budget Constraint  











pp of GDP Government Budget Constraint  (medium deviations - pp of GDP)
snow ball effect t+1 Primary Balance t+1 Stock flow t+1 ∆ Debt  t+1  
 
The European Commission forecasts would be unbiased in case of ME = 0 or close to zero, 
however, the track record seems to show an optimistic bias. This result in the budget 
government constraint may be explained a little by deviation in other economic variables – 
nominal GDP growth and weight of interest payments as gross debt of general government 
(see Table XIII). 
In the case of Ireland there was a particular situation of financial crisis since 2009, in which 
deficit of general government attained 14%, 31.2% and 13% in 2009, 2010 and 2011 
respectively. 
 
4.2.1.4 Expenditure-to-GDP ratio: numerator and denominator effects 
We studied the deviation of the European Commission forecasts between the realizations and 
predictions of expenditure and revenue-to-GDP ratios, which had been projected in year t for 
t+1. The period includes the vintage forecasts from Spring 1999 to Autumn 2010. Table XIV 
















Belgium 0.41 0.34 0.07 
Germany 0.14 -0.26 0.40 
Greece 0.94 0.70 0.25 
Spain 0.32 0.49 -0.16 
France 0.58 0.39 0.20 
Ireland 2.15 1.44 0.71 
Italy 0.52 0.11 0.41 
Luxembourg 0.29 0.24 0.05 
Netherlands 0.47 0.47 0.00 
Austria 0.25 0.22 0.04 
Portugal 0.72 0.55 0.18 
Finland 0.67 0.28 0.40 
Denmark 0.63 0.35 0.29 
Sweden 0.00 -0.72 0.72 
United Kingdom 0.66 -0.59 1.26 
European Union 0.43 0.07 0.36 
Euro Area 0.43 0.18 0.25 
 
Since in most countries the average prediction was for negative variations of expenditure 
relative to GDP (with the exception of Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Spain), we may 
conclude that realizations of variations have not been negative as forecasted. 
 









pp of GDP Decomposition of expenditure-to-GDP deviation







The results also suggest that the European Commission projections have initially some 
optimistic bias about the spending-to-GDP ratio in most countries, which afterwards is not 
fulfilled. This outcome is rather in line with the results of Moulin and Wierts (2006), who 
studied the government forecast through the SGPs, showing the inability of governments to 
cut expenditure and reporting also evidence of deliberately optimistic growth forecasts in 
order to justify nominal spending increases. 
The forecasts about decomposition of the nominal/numerator and the denominator effects 
were consistently, in the entire sample, i.e. a favourable path of nominal GDP and an in 
increase of nominal expenditure, in which the denominator effect was stronger than the 
nominal/numerator one in most countries. 
The deviations in the nominal/numerator effect in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
have been favourable, which means that predictions about the variation of nominal 
expenditure were lower than realizations while in another countries increase of nominal 
expenditure became higher than predicted.  
In addition, deviations of the denominator effect mean that GDP nominal growth presented a 
lower contribution to reduce the expenditure-to-GDP ratio than predicted in most countries 
(an exception was Spain). Furthermore, it would still be possible to study the decomposition 
of nominal GDP growth between real output variation and deflator increase as mentioned 
before. 
 
4.2.1.5 Revenue-to-GDP ratio: numerator and denominator effects 
Again for the same period of EC vintage forecasts, from Spring 1999
11
 to Autumn 2010, 
regarding predictions in year t to year t+1 as before, the decomposition of revenue ratios 
between nominal/numerator and denominator effects does not seem to present a pattern.  
Table XV presents the decomposition of the revenue ratio in the same way as the expenditure 
one, and we can see that the European Commission predictions seem to have overestimated 
the variation of the revenue ratios in most cases, except in Spain. The medium forecast of 
revenue ratio variation in this period was negative for most countries and positive in some 
cases (Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Therefore, realizations have been as 
favourable as predicted. 
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Belgium 0.31 0.25 0.06 
Germany 0.18 -0.19 0.37 
Greece 0.16 -0.24 0.40 
Spain -0.40 -0.19 -0.21 
France 0.13 -0.04 0.17 
Ireland 0.38 -0.01 0.40 
Italy 0.37 -0.02 0.39 
Luxembourg 0.24 0.29 -0.05 
Netherlands 0.09 0.12 -0.03 
Austria 0.24 0.20 0.04 
Portugal 0.47 0.27 0.20 
Finland 0.73 0.40 0.34 
Denmark 0.64 0.37 0.27 
Sweden 0.12 -0.61 0.73 
United Kingdom 0.02 -1.01 1.03 
European Union 0.11 -0.21 0.32 
Euro Area 0.14 -0.08 0.22 
 
The forecasts about the decomposition of the numerator denominator effects show the same 
path in all countries, similarly to the case of expenditure ratios, specifically a positive path of 
nominal GDP and a raise of nominal revenue, in which the denominator effect would be 
stronger than the numerator effect in most countries (exceptions are Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom as mentioned before). 
Predictions about nominal revenue were positive on average for all countries. Therefore, we 
can conclude that positive (negative) deviations of the numerator effect mean that predictions 
about variations of nominal receipts were lower (higher) than realizations. Spain recorded 
nominal spending increases lower than predicted, which contributed favourably to offset the 


















pp of GDP Decomposition of revenue-to-GDP deviation
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4.2.2 Portuguese Government forecasts 
4.2.2.1 Regression analysis 
Notwithstanding some tests about serial correlation explained below, regression (1) in Table 
XVI shows that real GDP growth deviations are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Therefore, a deviation of 1 pp between real GDP growth and the predicted real GDP has a 
positive impact of 0.64 pp on the deviation of the budget balance ratio. In line with automatic 
stabilizers, a higher real GDP growth may be connected, for instance, with a lower level of 
social benefits and increasing revenues from social security contributions as well as increases 
in tax revenues. In addition, price growth deviations have a similar effect, i.e. a difference of 1 
pp between realization and prediction has a positive impact on the budget balance-to-GDP 
ratio of 0.48 pp. In this case the positive impact of the deviation may be connected with the 
imperfect tax indexation system of some taxes – especially direct ones, i.e. the taxation is 
defined in the State Budget in line with the prediction of nominal income. However, a higher 
level of income due to higher inflation would mean larger revenues for the government.  
 
The dependent variable is the deviation of the budget balance ratio  and 
independent ones are deviations of real GDP growth and prices variation. In the case of 






Table XVI. Estimation for the balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, ( ) 
(annual data, 1977-2011) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
Constant -0.4242  -0.4075 
 (-1.3)  (-0.8) 
Real GDP growth deviation 0.6370*** 0.6310*** 0.5241*** 
 (4.3) (4.6) (3.5) 
Prices variation deviation 0.4818*** 0.4416*** 0.3639*** 
 (5.2) (5.0) (4,3) 
AR(1)   0.4138** 
   (2.6) 
 Adjusted R-square 0.54 0.53 0.57 
Observations 35 35 34 
 
In addition, it is interesting that during last two decades predictions seems to have 
overestimated real GDP growth and underestimated the increase of prices level, which tends 
to present a deviation of nominal GDP growth not so large, but with an unfavourable 
decomposition. It is possible to verify this result through average of deviations of real GDP 
growth when compared with prices variation during last two decades. 
 
The Durbin-Watson statistics from regression (1) does not allow a clear conclusion about 
serial correlation (DW=1.26, in the range 1.14–1.37 of 1% significance), which is 
inconclusive and results should be read carefully. Therefore, we analyzed the serial 
correlation possibility based on the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. In Table 
XVII we report the probability of each lag of the residual term under the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation. We can conclude that there is no correlation of residual terms of one per 
cent significance.  
 
Table XVII. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test, (annual data 1977-2011) 
H0: no serial correlation 
 
Lag Observations * R2 Probability 
1 3.8 0.0510 
2 4.6 0.1012 
3 9.8 0.0206 
4 13.1 0.0110 
5 13.1 0.0223 
 
Therefore, it is possible to analyze the impact of the independent variables through 
regression (3) by taking into account the rejection of absence of serial correlation. Deviations 





magnitude of each estimated coefficient is somewhat lower than in regressions (1) and (2), 
0.52 pp and 0.36 pp, respectively.  
4.2.2.2 Decomposition of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio 
Furthermore, it is also interesting to study a decomposition of deviation about balance-to-
GDP ratio, which may be explained by nominal error of balance as well as by denominator 
effect, obtained from the two following equations (see Moulin and Wierts, 2006, for a similar 
rationale):  
*B B ut t t  ,      (18) 
*GDP GDP vt t t  .     (19) 
where  Bt denotes realization of nominal balance in currency, GDPt is the realization of 
nominal GDP in cash, Bt
*
 is the prediction of balance in currency and GDPt
*
 denotes the 
nominal GDP underlying the forecast. Furthermore, ut and vt are deviations in cash between 
realization and forecast of the nominal balance and of the nominal GDP, respectively.  
However, since nominal GDP in currency, GDPt
*
 is not available in state budget reports in 
most years and vt would seem then impossible to find. Nevertheless, we can actually derive a 
decomposition of the effects. The deviation between realization and prediction of the budget 
balance relative to GDP may be detailed as follows: 
* * * * * * *( ) ( )
* * * * *( )
B B B u B B u GDP B GDP vt t t t t t t t t t t
GDPt GDP GDP v GDP GDP v GDPt t t t t t t
   
   
 
   (20) 
*
* * * * * * *( )
* * *( ) ( )
Btu vt t
B GDP u GDP B GDP B v GDPt t t t t t t t t









u B vt t t





Therefore, it is possible to identify which share of the deviation can be explained by 
differences in nominal balances and the impact of wrong nominal GDP forecasts, which may 
be explained by the inability of predicting and/or different international environment. 
Figure 4 presents the decomposition of the budget balance ratio, between nominal balance and 
nominal GDP in percentage points. The size of the deviations of nominal GDP seems to be 
larger in the first half of the period, which may be connected with a feature of the Portuguese 





making predictions more difficult during that instable period. Until the end of the 1980s, 
deviations of nominal GDP seem to be stronger than the unfavourable nominal budget 
balance deviations. 










pp of GDP Decomposition of balance-to-GDP deviation
Balance-to-GDP deviation Nominal Balance effect nominal GDP effect
 
 
In 1977 the Portuguese Government requested financial assistance to the IMF
12
 due to budget 
deficits, increasing of unemployment, energy prices and inflationary pressures, as well as 
internal instability and a world recession. In 1983 the Portuguese Government requested again 
financial assistance caused by foreign high interest rates, trade imbalances and large budget 
deficits.  
 
In 2009 the divergence of the budget balance ratio is almost fully explained by the deficit 
nominal effect, which may have been determined by an additional increase in expenditure in 
order to avoid a deeper recession. The supplementary budget presented in the beginning of 
2009 (Iniciativa para o Investimento e o Emprego)
13
 as well as other ways of supplementary 
expenditure may be examples of an attempt to avoid a larger fall of output.  









The international financial and economic crisis since the subprime in USA until the sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe has created an instable international environment. Therefore, it has 
become more difficult predicting real GDP, budget balances, net exports and yields of public 
debt. Interest payments have increased under the debt crisis period. There is a large share of 
gross debt which had been issued through Fixed Rate Bond (OT) before 2008 as well as the 
exchange of long term securities that mature in favour of new short-run securities – Treasury 
Bills (BT) had allowed containing the rise of interest payments during some time. 
 
Furthermore, we should bear in mind that some budgetary targets were attained in some years 
(or the nominal balance deviations were close to the targets in other ones) because 
Governments used some temporary measures in order to achieve the budgetary commitments, 
which have been taken in the State Budget Law even during the year of budget 
implementation in some cases. For example, CTT in 2003 (0.9% of GDP), CGD, ANA and 
Casa da Moeda in 2004 (2.0%), PT Comunicações (1.6%) and some pension funds of 




Figure 5 presents deviations in percentage points of GDP between realization and forecast of 
both general government balance ratio and temporary measures for the period 2000-2011 as a 
percentage of GDP. The source of the data concerning temporary measures is the Relatório do 
Conselho de Administração - A Economia Portuguesa em 2011, which contains some 
temporary measures that had been scheduled during the initial State Budget Law. One-off and 
temporary measures according to the Eurosystem definition include, for example, sales of 
non-financial assets and revenues resulting from the transfers of pensions to the general 
government.  
Fiscal rules for the budget balance ratio based on potential output would be biased because, as 
already mentioned, there have been successive revisions of the output gap (Kempkes, 2012). 
In the Portuguese case, when we analyzed the last two decades, it could have drawn wrong 
conclusions because the final results of the balance-to-GDP ratio have been worse than the 
first estimates of the European Commission, which may be explained not only by output gap 
revisions, but also nominal balance revisions. See Appendix Table A6. 
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In this thesis we have found evidence of systematic deviations in the forecasts underlying the 
budget balance-to-GDP ratios. In the case of the European Commission forecasts, our 
estimations allow the conclusion that the real GDP growth deviation and prices variation can 
explain budget deficit deviations when predicted in t to year t+1.  
Indeed, higher real GDP than predicted has a positive impact on taxes’ revenue and 
expenditure through automatic stabilizers, while higher inflation can influence budget 
balances through the imperfect tax indexation system. The deviation of total investment 
growth has also a statistical significance, revealing a positive deviation, and therefore a 
favourable impact on the budget balance. On the other hand, unemployment rate deviations 
do not present relevant impact on budget balance-to-GDP. 
The fiscal rules index has a statistical significance for the period 1990-2010 in the case of an 
unbalanced panel and absence of fixed effects, i.e. higher performance of fiscal rules has a 
positive impact on budget balance-to-GDP deviations. The fiscal rule index may be a way to 
overcome specific features of each country, which would be estimated through fixed effects in 





The SUR estimations allow identifying the variables with impact on the budget balance 
deviation in each country. There are differences about significance and magnitude of 
parameters among countries. 
Our estimations based in the Portuguese official forecasts imply that wrong or optimistic 
assumptions about growth and prices are risky factors with negative impact on the budgetary 
outcomes. Our estimation results suggest that a 1 pp deviation of real GDP growth or prices 
variation has a relevant impact on budget balance ratio. The correlation between the studied 
economic variables, real GDP, and prices variation with the dependent variable deviation 
balance-to-GDP ratio seems reasonable, i.e. in case of accurate independent variables 
forecasts, the target of balance-to-GDP ratio seems attainable. Therefore, the credibility of the 
Portuguese fiscal policy, which may had spilled over to the financial and capital markets, may 
be based on less realistic assumptions about the variation of real GDP and prices.  
Moreover, the budget balance ratio error can be decomposed into a numerator and a 
denominator effect. Our evidence suggests that there has been an unfavourable error about the 
numerator effect (i.e. the budget balance in nominal currency) in most years, which has been 
offset (totally or partially) by a favourable denominator effect connected with nominal GDP. 
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Table A1. Estimation for the first difference of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio 
deviation, 1969-2011, *( )
1 1t tb b     (two stage least squares) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
constant 0.0059 0.0044 0.0065 
 (0.9) (0.7) (0.8) 
Δ real GDP growth deviation   0.3791*** 0.3914*** 0.3877*** 
 (7.8) (7.0) (7.5) 
Δ investment growth deviation 0.1028*** 0.1057*** 0.1232*** 
 (8.3) (7.9) (13.5) 
Δ inflation deviation 0.2843** 0.2903** 0.3004** 
 (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) 
Δ unemployment rate deviation  0.0742 0.0973 
  (0.6) (0.8) 
Δ current account deviation   0.0662** 
   (2.4) 
Estimate of Δ real GDP growth deviation   -0.0832 -0.0926 -0.1043 
 (-0.7) (-0.7) (-0.7) 
AR(1) -0.3347*** 0.3334*** -0.3400*** 
  (-6.4) (-7.1) (-7.3) 
Adjusted R-square 0.36 0.36 0.37 
Observations 480 479 470 
Period  1974-2011 1974-2011 1974-2011 







Table A2. Estimation for the budget balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1969-2011,   
*
( )
1 1t tb b   (two stage least squares) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
constant 0.1342 0.1361 0.1296 
 (1.5) (1.5) (1.3) 
real GDP growth deviation   0.3946*** 0.3715*** 0.3644*** 
 (10.1) (8.5) (9.0) 
investment growth deviation 0.0983*** 0.0977*** 0.1123*** 
 (5.3) (5.2) (6.5) 
inflation deviation 0.2164** 0.2032** 0.2084** 
 (2.5) (2.4) (2.5) 
unemployment rate deviation  -0.050 -0.0835 
  (0.-9) (-0.8) 
current account deviation   0.0567*** 
   (2.8) 
Estimate of  real GDP growth deviation   0.3143 0.4296 0.4025 
 (1.1) (1.6) (1.4) 
AR(1) 0.2746*** 0.2671*** 0.2690*** 
  (11.3) (9.4) (11.2) 
Adjusted R-square 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Observations 497 496 488 
Period  1973-2011 1973-2011 1973-2011 






Table A3. Estimation for the budget balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1998:1-2010:2,   
*
( )
1 1t tb b   (instrumental variables) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
(4) 
constant -0.6909*** -0.6091*** -0.5685*** -0.2646 
 (-3.4) (-3.8) (-4.8) (-1.4) 
real GDP growth deviation   0.4136*** 0.1330 0.1618 0.4344*** 
 (5.3) (0.8) (1.1) (5.1) 
investment growth deviation  0.1760** 0.1642***  
  (2.0) (2.7)  
inflation deviation 0.6985*** 0.7058*** 0.7029*** 0.7298*** 
 (4.2) (4.3) (4.7) (5.0) 
unemployment rate deviation -0.1630 -0.0377   
 (-0.6) (-0.1)   
balance-to-GDP in t0 -0.0280 -0.1141   
 (-0.1) (-0.5)   
Fiscal rules index    -0.5474*** 
    (-2.8) 
Estimate of  real GDP growth deviation   -0.0203 -0067 -0.0023 -0.0345 
 (-0.3) (-0.1) (-0.0) (-0.4) 
AR(1) 0.5962*** 0.5966*** 0.5567*** 0.6026*** 
  (9.3) (10.6) (10.1) (18.0) 
Adjusted R-square 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.68 


















Table A4. Estimation for the budget balance-to-GDP ratio deviation, 1998:1-2010:2,   
*
( )
1 1t tb b   (two stage least squares) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
constant -0.6909*** -0.6091*** -0.5685*** -0.2646 
 (-3.4) (-3.8) (-4.8) (-1.4) 
real GDP growth deviation   0.4136*** 0.1330 0.1618 0.4344*** 
 (5.3) (0.8) (1.1) (5.1) 
investment growth deviation  0.1760** 0.1642***  
  (2.0) (2.8)  
inflation deviation 0.6985*** 0.7058*** 0.7029*** 0.7298*** 
 (4.2) (4.3) (4,7) (5.0) 
unemployment rate deviation -0.1630 -0.0377   
 (-0.6) (-0.1)   
balance-to-GDP in t0 -0.0280 -0.1141   
 (-0.1) (-0.4)   
Fiscal rules index    -0.7459*** 
    (-2.8) 
Estimate of  real GDP growth deviation   -0.0206 -0.0067 -0.0023 -0.0354 
 (-0.3) (-0.1) (-0.0) (-0.4) 
AR(1) 0.5962*** 0.5966*** 0.5567*** 0.5026*** 
  (9.3) (10.6) (10.2) (18.0) 
Adjusted R-square 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.68 






























1977  5,8  -1,5 7,4  n.a. 
1978  0,5  -5,4 6,0  n.a. 
1979  1,6  -4,1 5,6  n.a. 
1980  2,6  -4,5 7,0  n.a. 
1981  0,8  -6,0 6,8  n.a. 
1982  1,7  -4,5 6,2  n.a. 
1983  2,9  -2,3 5,2  n.a. 
1984  1,3  -2,4 3,7  n.a. 
1985  1,3  -3,5 4,7  n.a. 
1986  3,7  -1,3 4,9  n.a. 
1987  2,1  -1,4 3,5  n.a. 
1988  4,8  1,6 3,3  n.a. 
1989  4,8  1,8 3,0  n.a. 
1990  1,8  -0,9 2,8  n.a. 
1991  -0,5  -2,6 2,1  n.a. 
1992  -0,1  -1,4 1,3  n.a. 
1993  -3,3  -4,2 0,9  n.a. 
1994  0,4  -1,7 2,1  n.a. 
1995  0,8  -0,3 1,1  n.a. 
1996  -0,3  -1,1 0,8  n.a. 
1997  -0,5  -1,2 0,7  n.a. 
1998  -1,0  -1,7 0,7  n.a. 
1999  -0,7  -1,7 1,0  n.a. 
2000  -1,4  -1,8 0,3  0,3 
2001  -3,2  -3,4 0,2  - 
2002  -1,3  -2,0 0,6  1,3 
2003  -0,7  -1,4 0,7  2,3 
2004  -0,6  -1,4 0,8  2,0 
2005  -3,1  -3,9 0,8  -0,1 
2006  0,5  -0,3 0,8  - 
2007  0,5  0,3 0,2  0,1 
2008  -1,3  -1,3 0,0  1,1 
2009  -8,0  -7,9 -0,1  - 
2010  -1,5  -1,8 0,3  1,7 
















Final results  
1977 -8.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -2.8 
1978 -7.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -7.1 
1979 -7.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -6.1 
1980 -9.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -6.9 
1981 -9.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -8.3 
1982 -8.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -7.0 
1983 -7.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -4.9 
1984 -6.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -5.2 
1985 -9.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -8.3 
1986 -11.1 -11.2 n.a. -8.5 n.a. -7.4 
1987 -8.9 -9.0 -7.5 -8.1 -8.4 -6.8 
1988 -8.4 -7.9 -7.8 -6.6 -6.5 -3.5 
1989 -7.7 -6.3 -7.8 -5.0 -3.8 -2.9 
1990 -7.9 -7.4 -6.1 -5.8 -5.8 -6.1 
1991 -6.5 -5.5 -5.6 -6.4 -6.4 -6.9 
1992 -4.3 -5.4 -4.6 -5.4 -5.2 -4.4 
1993 -4.2 -5.7 -4.8 -7.1 -7.2 -7.4 
1994 -7.5 -6.2 -8.2 -5.8 -5.8 -7.1 
1995 -5.8 -5.6 -5.8 -5.4 -5.1 -5.4 
1996 -4.2 -4.4 -4.7 -4.1 -3.2 -4.8 
1997 -2.9 -3.0 -2.9 -2.5 -2.5 -3.7 
1998 -2.5 -2.2 -2.4 -2.3 -1.5 -3.9 
1999 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -3.1 
2000 -1.5 -1.5 -1.2 -1.4 -1.5 -3.3 
2001 -1.1 -1.5 -1.4 -2.7 -4.1 -4.8 
2002 -1.6 -2.6 -1.6 -2.7 -2.7 -3.4 
2003 -2.4 -3.5 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -3.7 
2004 -2.8 -3.4 -3.3 -2.9 -3.0 -4.0 
2005 -2.8 -4.9 -3.7 -6.0 -6.0 -6.5 
2006 -4.6 -5.0 -5.0 -3.9 -3.9 -4.6 
2007 -3.7 -3.5 -4.0 -2.6 -2.6 -3.2 
2008 -2.4 -2.2 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7 -3.7 
2009 -2.2 -6.5 -2.8 -9.4 -9.3 -10.2 
2010 -8.3 -8.5 -8.0 -9.1 -9.8 -9.8 
2011 -4.6 -5.9 -4.9 -4.2 n.a. -4.2 
 
 
 
